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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 22, 1987, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying a
motion for an order directing issuance and service of trial subpoenas
upon the Ambassador of Canada to the United States, or his wife.' The
trial subpoenas were sought by the Independent Counsel in connection
with the prosecution for perjury of former White House Deputy Chief
of Staff Michael K. Deaver. A legal issue of first impression was
presented by this proceeding as the subpoenas were sought on theories
of express and implied waiver of diplomatic immunity.
Two broad issues are raised by this opinion. First, whether the au-
thority to decide the validity of a claim of diplomatic immunity resides
exclusively in either the executive or judicial branch, or initially in the
executive branch with Article III court review. Second, if the judiciary
1. United States v. Deaver, Crim. No. 87-0096 (D.D.C. June 22, 1987). Testi-
mony was sought with reference to conversation at a dinner attended by Mr. Deaver,
his wife, Ambassador Allan Gotlieb, and his wife. The Independent Counsel acknowl-
edged the duplicative nature of Mrs. Gotlieb's testimony which was considered only as
an alternative. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash Subpoenas at 1,
Deaver (Crim. No. 87-0096).
(259)
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is involved in the waiver determination, what standards should the
court apply.
Parts I and II of this Note examine the authority of the courts to
determine who is entitled to diplomatic immunity, who may waive that
immunity, and the limits within which the courts must operate in de-
termining the validity of the waiver. Part III explores the constitutional
and interpretive support for the position propounded by the Justice and
State Departments. These departments allege that the executive branch
holds exclusive authority to determine diplomatic status and waiver of
immunity. Part IV reviews the District Court's refusal to find an ex-
press waiver in a Canadian diplomatic note which offered the Ambas-
sador's assistance in the investigation that preceded the indictment in
this case. The Note then evaluates the Canadians' actual participation
in the investigation as an alternative basis for waiver.
II. BACKGROUND
On May 29, 1986, the Special Division of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia issued an order appointing In-
dependent Counsel to investigate possible violations of the Ethics In
Government Act by former White House Deputy Chief of Staff
Michael K. Deaver.' The order directed an investigation into Mr.
Deaver's activities on behalf of the Government of Canada in connec-
tion with a controversy about United States action concerning acid
rain.3 Mr. Deaver undertook the questioned activities pursuant to a
contractual agreement signed by Ambassador Allan Gotlieb, as agent
for the Government of Canada."
Using State Department diplomatic channels, the Independent
Counsel sought cooperation from the Canadians in the investigation.5
The Government of Canada responded through the same channels in
July, 1986 with a note entitled "TALKING POINTS," agreeing to
cooperate and to "request the cooperation" of Ambassador Gotlieb.6
2. Order Appointing Independent Counsel (D.C. Cir. May 29, 1986). The special
counsel was appointed by the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986).
3. Order Appointing Independent Counsel, supra note 2, at 2.
4. Declaration by Whitney North Seymour, Jr., at Exhibit "L," annexed to Mem-
orandum In Opposition to Motion to Quash Subpoenas, Deaver (Crim. No. 87-0096)
[hereinafter Declaration II].
5. Declaration of Whitney North Seymour, Jr., at 2, annexed to Motion of Inde-
pendent Counsel for Order Directing the Issuance and Service of a Trial Subpoena on
Allan Gotlieb, Deaver (Crim. No. 87-0096) [hereinafter Declaration I].
6. Id. at Exhibit "C."
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Two sets of questions were submitted to and answered by the
Ambassador.7
Before Mr. Deaver was indicted for perjury for his responses
before a federal grand jury with reference to his activities on behalf of
Canada, the Government of Canada asserted its immunity to prevent
the Ambassador from testifying at trial.' The Independent Counsel
then filed a motion for an order directing the issuance and service of a
trial subpoena to compel the Ambassador's testimony."
Anticipating a suggestion of diplomatic immunity,10 the Indepen-
dent Counsel asserted that the Ambassador's right to diplomatic immu-
nity had been waived by the language of the Talking Points." Also at
issue as a potential waiver of the immunity was the Canadian partici-
pation in the investigation, by virtue of the Ambassador's response to
questions propounded in accordance with Canadian requests." In addi-
tion, the forum-selection clause of Deaver's personal services contract
was mentioned to support a finding of waiver.1 s
In a Memorandum Opinion and Order, the District Court as-
sumed, without deciding the issue, that it had jurisdiction to decide the
issue of waiver of diplomatic immunity." The Court then held that the
Talking Points "neither expressly nor by any fair implication" consti-
tuted a waiver." Neither the Canadians' participation in the investiga-
tion nor the contract forum-selection clause was mentioned in the
opinion. 16
7. Id. at Exhibits "A" and "B." Because of the sensitive nature of the contents
and the uncertain nature of the proceedings, both sets of responses, entitled "Aide
Memoirs," were treated as classified and submitted as sealed exhibits. Id. at 2.
8. Declaration I, supra note 5, at 4.
9. Motion of Independent Counsel for Order Directing the Issuance and Service
of a Trial Subpoena on Allan Gotlieb, Deaver (Crim. No. 87-0096).
10. The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 254d (1982), provides
that:
Any action or proceeding brought against an individual who is entitled to immu-
nity with respect to such action or proceeding under the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, under section 254b or 254c of this title, or under any other
laws extending diplomatic privileges and immunities, shall be dismissed. Such im-
munity may be established upon motion or suggestion by or on behalf of the indi-
vidual, or as otherwise permitted by law or applicable rules of procedure.
(Emphasis added).
I. Declaration I, supra note 5, at 6.
12. Id. at 7.
13. Declaration 11, supra note 4, at 7.
14. Memorandum and Order at 5, Deaver (Crim. No. 87-0096).
15. Id.
16. The forum-selection clause provides that the "contract shall be interpreted in
1988]
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III. JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE STATUS AND WAIVER
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations1 7
provides that, with certain exceptions, a diplomatic agent shall be im-
mune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the receiving state's
courts, and shall "not [be] obliged to give evidence as a witness.""
Article 32 states that this immunity may be waived by the sending
state, but that the waiver must always be express. 19 The United States
Departments of State and Justice took the position in this case that the
executive branch holds an exclusive prerogative to determine the merits
of a claim of diplomatic immunity. Since the issue has never been
squarely decided by any court, there is only limited, qualified, support
for this position.
accordance with the laws of the District of Columbia." Declaration II, supra note 4,
Exhibit "L" at 3, Deaver (Crim. No. 87-0096). This reflects a willingness to submit to
United States jurisdiction with respect to legal disputes arising from the contract.
Despite the fact that the contract is subscribed by Ambassador Gotlieb, there are
no words of express waiver of diplomatic immunity. Even if there had been, the investi-
gation may have involved negotiations leading up to the signing of the contract and
activities by Mr. Deaver in performance of the contract, but it did not arise from the
contract per se.
17. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (ratified by the United States in 1972)
[hereinafter the "Vienna Convention"].
18. Id. Article 31 states:
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the
receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative
jurisdiction, except in the case of:
(a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of
the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the pur-
poses of the mission;
(b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as
executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of
the sending state;
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.
2. A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.
19. Id., Article 32 states:
1. The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of persons enjoying
immunity under Article 37 may be waived by the sending State.
2. Waiver must always be express.
3. The initiation of proceedings by a diplomatic agent or by a person enjoying
immunity from jurisdiction under Article 37 shall preclude him from invoking im-
munity from jurisdiction in respect of any counter-claim directly connected with
the principal claim.
20. United States' Reply to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Quash Got-
lieb Subpoenas at 3, Deaver (Crim. No. 87-0096).
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There are two essential steps to this consideration. First, whether
the subject possesses the status entitled to immunity; and second,
whether that entitlement has been waived. The inquiry at this stage
focuses on the competence of the courts to make either determination.
A. Jurisdiction to Determine Diplomatic Status
The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1979 authorizes immunity from
suit, not from jurisdiction.2 Jurisdiction and immunity are separate
concepts.22 If jurisdiction does not obtain, then immunity need not be
considered.2" Ambassador Gotlieb's presence in the United States is all
that is required in order to subject him to the personal jurisdiction of
the federal district court as a witness.' Once jurisdiction obtains, the
issue is whether jurisdiction should be "relinquished in conformity to
an overriding principle of substantive law."25 The determination may
be by way of a simple deference to a State Department finding,26 or by
a hearing on the factual circumstances attendant to a party's claim of
21. 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-254e (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
22. Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587 (1943).
23. See, id.
24. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(e). Notice, however, that personal jurisdiction in matters
where a diplomat is intended as a party must be accomplished by personal service of
process. This could present a problem which would require that the determination of
status and immunity take place in conjunction with a hearing with reference to refusal
of service. See infra note 50.
25. Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 588.
26. See, e.g., Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Virtually
every case that defers to State Department certification of an ambassador's status, in-
cluding Carrera, relies on In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890). The Court in Baiz had
before it several documents between the State Department and Baiz purporting to indi-
cate the diplomatic nature of his occupation. Id. at 406-13. Among these was a letter in
which State clearly stated that it did not regard Baiz' position to be one to which
diplomatic status attached. Id. at 413. The Court found no entitlement to diplomatic
immunity:
[W]e do not assume to sit in judgment upon the decision of the executive in refer-
ence to the public character of a person claiming to be a foreign minister, and
therefore have the right to accept the certificate of the State Department that a
party is or is not a privileged person, and cannot properly be asked to proceed
upon argumentative or collateral proof.
Id. at 432. The Court based this deference on three cases: United States v. Liddle, 26
F.Cas. 936 (C.C.D.Pa. 1808) (No. 15,598); United States v. Ortega, 27 F.Cas. 359
(C.C.E.D.Pa. 1825) (No. 15,971); and United States v. Benner, 24 F.Cas. 1084
(C.C.E.D.Pa. 1830) (No. 14,568); each of which held that a certificate by the Secre-
tary of State attesting to the subject's receipt as a foreign minister was the best evi-
dence of his diplomatic character. See Baiz at 421-22.
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immunity.27
Opinions of the State Department as to diplomatic status of an
individual have generally been accepted by courts as conclusive.28 It is
remarkable, however, that in most cases, the courts have reviewed the
basis upon which the State Department's conclusion rested.29 The sub-
ject of review was the validity of the evidence on which the State De-
partment based its recognition of diplomatic status. In at least one
case, the court found that the status was improperly determined.?
The basis for the assertion that the executive has the authority to
determine status and waiver rests on the executive's exercise of power
to conduct foreign affairs, make treaties, and specifically, to "receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers." '31 This blanket authority is
generally accepted by the courts when the executive determines that a
foreign government is entitled to immunity.3" However, in response to
27. See, e.g., United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984).
28. E.g., Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 589 ("This practice is founded upon the
policy, recognized by both the Department of State and the courts, that our national
interest will be better served in such cases if the wrongs to suitors, involving our rela-
tions with a friendly foreign power, are righted through diplomatic negotiations rather
than by the compulsion of judicial proceedings"); In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890);
Abdulaziz v. Dade County, 741 F.2d 1328, 1331 (1 1th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Arlington, 669 F.2d 925 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 801 (1982); Carrera v. Car-
rera, 174 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 665 F.Supp.
793 (N.D.Cal. 1987).
29. See e.g., Marcos, 665 F. Supp. at 799; In re Baiz, 135 U.S. at 425-26; Arling-
ton, 669 F.2d at 930; United States v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F.Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
30. In Vulcan Iron Works, Inc. v. Polish Amer. Mach. Corp., 479 F.Supp. 1060
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), the Department of State accepted the Polish Commercial Counselor
(the "PCC") as a recognized official office of the Polish Peoples Republic in the United
States. In a Statement of Interest to the Court, full diplomatic status was extended to
the employees of the Counselor's office, and the Court was informed that the employees
were not subject to deposition subpoenas. The Court reviewed the method by which the
Department of State had been informed of the PCC's operations, and found that notifi-
cation was improper under Article 10 of the Vienna Convention. Id. at 1067. The
Court held that the status recognized by State was unfounded and the employees were
ordered to comply with the subpoenas. Id. at 1068.
In United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984), no State Depart-'
ment suggestion of immunity was involved. A member of Bulgaria's New York trade
office, indicted for espionage, raised diplomatic immunity as a defense. The Second
Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal of the action.
31. Statement of Interest of the United States at 7, Deaver (Crim. No. 87-0096)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3. See generally United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
229 (1942); United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
("The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations."); Jones v.
U.S., 137 U.S. 202, 213 (1890).
32. See, e.g., Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 588. This deference to executive deter-
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concerns that executive determinations may reflect political, rather
than legal considerations,3" Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act34 and "transfer[ed] the determination of sovereign im-
munity from the executive branch to the judicial branch."3 5 While this
applies to sovereign immunity and does not directly affect the immu-
nity of the diplomat, it severely undercuts a broad claim of absolute
executive authority in this area of foreign affairs.
Although the executive has a clear constitutional grant of author-
ity to receive ambassadors, it seems equally clear that the status of a
person as ambassador could be put in issue ancillary to his receipt as
such.38 If the status is found valid, then the person's receipt as ambas-
sador could not be further challenged without doing clear violence to
the Article II mandate.
Diplomatic immunity arises not under the Constitution, but under
the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 ("Act") 7 and the Vienna Con-
vention.38 The Constitution is, however, the judicial power that extends
"to all Cases ... arising under ... the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties [and] . . . to all Cases affecting Ambassadors . . . ."I There-
fore, the courts have jurisdiction over proceedings concerning diplo-
matic immunity40 because they arise under the Act and the Vienna
mination does not, however, stand on Constitutional grounds. In The Schooner Ex-
change v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812), Chief Justice Marshall
suggested that sovereign immunity is a matter of grace and comity, rather than one of
Constitutional imperative. Since the executive branch is primarily responsible for for-
eign affairs generally, judicial deference to executive suggestion on whether the U.S.
should take jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentali-
ties was a natural consequence. See Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 588-89.
33. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487-88 (1983).
34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) [hereinafter FSIA]
35. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6604.
36. Vulcan Iron Works, 479 F.Supp. at 1067.
37. 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-254e (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
38. Vienna Convention, supra note 17.
39. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
40. The Constitution also provides that "[iun all Cases affecting Ambassadors...
the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction." Id. This jurisdiction is not exclusive
by virtue of its original character. St. Lukes Hospital v. Barclay, 21 F.Cas. 212, 214
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1855) (No. 12,241). Exclusiveness may be provided or denied by Con-
gress. Bors v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252 (1884); Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884);
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 187 (1936). But see Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174-75 (1803). Indeed, the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
in this area was made exclusive by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Act of Sept. 24, 1789,
ch. 20 § 9, 1 Stat. 73. More recently 28 U.S.C. § 1251, which was derived from the
Judiciary Act of 1789, carried the exclusive qualifier until 1978, at which time the
1988]
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Convention, or, as in the Deaver case, the subject's status as ambassa-
dor is not at issue.'
While it is probable that the State Department will involve itself
in immunity matters, this is not always the case. 2 In such cases the
courts have treated diplomatic status as a question of fact, and pro-
ceeded to reach a conclusion.'
The Act provides that diplomatic immunity "may be established
upon motion or suggestion by or on behalf of lan) individual, or as
otherwise permitted by law or applicable rules of procedure.""' This
clearly places the determination of right to diplomatic immunity within
the province of the courts.
B. Jurisdiction to Determine Waiver
Once the ambassador's status is settled, either by deference to ex-
ecutive suggestion or by judicial determination, he is entitled to immu-
nity. A separation of powers argument could be made at this point,
alleging that subjecting the ambassador to jurisdiction to determine
waiver is an interference with his receipt by the executive. While this
has a certain theoretical attraction, it has no practical basis. If the am-
bassador and his sovereign do not acknowledge waiver, as in the Deaver
case, attendance at a hearing cannot be compelled, and receipt is
unaffected.
The ambassador's immunity extends to criminal and civil jurisdic-
tion with certain exceptions, and from the obligation to give evidence as
a witness in any case. 5 Waiver does not alter the status of the diplo-
mat, it is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right. While the issue
of waiver of diplomatic immunity has not previously been considered by
the courts, the nature of waiver places it within the competency of the
courts.
district courts gained concurrent original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982).
41. The Independent Counsel continuously recognized Ambassador Gotlieb's sta-
tus and acknowledged the original entitlement to immunity under Article 31 of the
Vienna Convention. Memorandum In Opposition to Motion to Quash Subpoenas at 1,
Deaver (Crim. No. 87-0096).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Kostadinov, 734 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984); Trost v.
Tompkins, 44 A.2d 226 (D.C. Mun.Ct.App. 1945).
43. Trost, 44 A.2d at 230 (right to immunity is a political question, but absent
executive determination as to a person's status, these are proper subjects for decision by
trial court).
44. 22 U.S.C. § 254d (1982).
45. Vienna Convention, supra note 17, Article 31, para. I and 2 (text supra note
18). See also, Vulcan Iron Works, 479 F.Supp. at 1063 n.3.
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The most straightforward example involves a strict compliance
with Article 32, paragraph 2, of the Vienna Convention, which requires
that waiver be express. Once the court determines that a person sub-
jected to the court's jurisdiction is entitled to immunity,46 that proceed-
ing would be dismissed as a matter of course pursuant to the Act. 47
To prevent dismissal of the action, the party seeking to proceed, or
in the case of service of process the party seeking service, should bear
the burden of alleging and proving waiver. 48 If an express waiver of
immunity has been executed by the sending state, the document would
serve as conclusive evidence. Because of the requirement that the
waiver be express when immunity of the diplomat is waived by the
sending state, the court considering the issue should require such
proof. 9
Neither the Vienna Convention nor the Act provide procedures by
which such a waiver is to be obtained or proffered. 50 It seems sensible
46. As is suggested supra, it is possible that it will not be apparent from the filings
that the subject actually possesses the prerequisite status for immunity to attach. In
that case the proceedings would continue in normal fashion until immunity was raised
as a defense either by the subject or by State Department suggestion on behalf of the
subject. Supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
47. 22 U.S.C. § 254d (1982) requires that "[any action or proceeding brought
against an individual who is entitled to immunity with respect to such action or pro-
ceeding . . . shall be dismissed."
48. See Hellenic Lines v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978, 980 n.3 (D.C.Cir. 1965).
49. It is unclear that such proof would always be required. Since immunity must
be claimed in order to be given effect, it is possible that one so entitled may submit to
jurisdiction with the knowledge of the sending state without the issue ever arising. This,
however, raises a separate problem.
Article 29 of the Vienna Convention requires that "[Tihe person of a diplomatic
agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The
receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to
prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity." It could be said that such at-
tacks are an element of the trial process inherent in the concept of cross-examination,
and essential to due process. Upon such a premise, it would be recommended that once
a witness or party is identified as one entitled to immunity, the court should require an
express waiver.
Another situation would arise if the State Department insisted on its authority to
determine status and waiver. This could be accomplished by State's withholding proof
of express waiver from the court while making a suggestion pursuant to 22 U.S.C. §
254d that any entitlement to immunity in the particular case had been expressly
waived.
50. The matter is discussed briefly by Judge Washington in his concurring opinion
in Hellenic Lines:
I would agree that the proper course of a complaining party seeking to serve pro-
cess upon an accredited ambassador is to request the State Department to ascer-
tain under accepted diplomatic practice whether diplomatic immunity[] will be
1988]
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that if it is in the local party's possession, then its sole function is as a
key to litigation. Therefore, the logical forum for its submission is the
court in which the action is pending.
Another alternative would be for the waiver to be maintained at
the Department of State subsequent to its grant, perhaps for national
security reasons. This would not present problems if the State Depart-
ment acknowledged the waiver, unless a court sua sponte requested
proof pursuant to the express waiver provision. The most unlikely prob-
lem would arise if the State Department concealed the existence of a
waiver for its own political purposes."
For the purpose of this examination it is sufficient to point out that
a court has statutory authority to allow an action to proceed if it is
presented with an express waiver. The proceedings upon express waiver
would not constitute a judicial interference with the executive's Consti-
tutional power to receive ambassadors because it is a mere acknowl-
edgement of the sending state's willingness to participate in the action.
The Constitution does not mandate either foreign state accession to ex-
ecutive receipt or foreign state behavior in accordance with executive
receipt.
IV. DETERMINATION OF WAIVER
According to the Vienna Convention, waiver of diplomatic immu-
nity must be express.5 2 The district court found no express waiver in
this case.53 The document supporting the waiver could have at best
served as a basis for a finding of an implied waiver of sovereign immu-
nity.54 The possibility of an implied waiver was justifiably not explored,
and the court made no mention of the forum-selection clause or Cana-
waived and service will be accepted in a particular case. I would also hold that the
complaining party's proper course, if the answer is affirmative, is to request that
the State Department make the diplomat's answer available to the court, and if
the answer is negative[,] the complainant should ordinarily discontinue its suit.
345 F.2d at 983. While this case dealt generally with sovereign immunity from suit, the
issue at bar was whether the diplomatic immunity of the ambassador would preclude
service of process on him as agent for the party sending state. The ambassador was not
personally joined as a party. Id. at 980.
In response to State Department inquiries, the embassy acknowledged an unwill-
ingness to accept service of process. Id. at 982.
51. This is unlikely for several reasons, including the Department of State's power
to deny requests for waivers and the foreign state's opportunity to provide a duplicate.
52. The Vienna Convention, supra note 17, Article 32 (text supra note 19).
53. Memorandum and Order at 5, Deaver (Crim. No. 87-0096).
54. Talking Points, supra note 6.
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dian participation in the investigation.55
A. Express Waiver of Diplomatic Immunity
The Talking Points did not expressly waive either diplomatic or
sovereign immunity. It is possible, however, to interpret the language of
the document as an implied waiver of sovereign immunity.
1. No Express Waiver
While no cases construing express waivers under the Vienna Con-
vention have been found, it can be supposed that Article 32 contem-
plates a clear statement including the words: "waive diplomatic immu-
nity." These words are not included in the Talking Points received by
the State Department from the Government of Canada.56 Article 32
provides in paragraph 1 that immunity may be waived by the sending
state.57 Besides the preclusion from invoking immunity from jurisdic-
tion with respect to counterclaims enunciated in paragraph 3 of that
article, and the implied waiver inherent in the institution of proceed-
ings, this is the only method by which a diplomat's immunity can be
waived.58 Since the document under consideration is from the Govern-
ment of Canada, this first provision is met.
The Government of Canada stated that it was "prepared to re-
quest the cooperation" of Ambassador Gotlieb in the investigation be-
ing conducted by the Independent Counsel.5 9 While this is not a clear
statement of waiver, it is a practical waiver in that it seeks to allow
specifically that from which Gotlieb is immune."'
The court made much of the circumstances of the cooperation,
characterizing it as "voluntary, unsigned, unsworn summary answers to
the queries posed, through a diplomatic, not a judicial, medium.""1 De-
spite this characterization, Ambassador Gotlieb did give evidence as a
witness in connection with a statement by his sending state that it was
requesting this cooperation. There can be no question that diplomatic
55. This is understandable because of the clear requirement that waivers be ex-
press and the fact that neither the forum-selection clause nor the Canadians' participa-
tion was brought to the fore as grounds in filings accompanying the motion for sub-
poena or the motion to quash.
56. Talking Points, supra note 6.
57. Vienna Convention, Supra note 19.
58. But see, infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text regarding implied waiver
for national security or safety of ambassador.
59. Talking Points, Supra note 6.
60. Vienna Convention, Supra note 18.
61. Memorandum and Order at 6, Deaver (Crim. No. 87-0096).
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immunity from any obligation to respond to the queries posed was
waived.
The issue, however, is how far this waiver extends. Since it is ex-
pressly directed at cooperation with the investigation, even if it were a
clear statement of waiver, it does not encompass participation as a trial
witness.6 2 The Talking Points clearly contemplate a personal appear-
ance by the Ambassador and reject that possibility." So if the exten-
sion of cooperation is put to a strict test, it fails as an express waiver. If
it is construed more loosely, it fails for not contemplating participation
62. The Independent Counsel suggested that diplomatic immunity be treated like
"any other legally-sanctioned witness protection, and that once it is waived, it is waived
for all purposes in the relevant proceeding .... Memorandum of Points and Authori-
ties In Support of Motion for an Order to Show Cause at 3, annexed to Motion For
Order Directing the Issuance and Service of a Trial Subpoena on Allan Gotlieb,
Deaver (Crim. No. 87-0096). There is an obvious logic to this position in that the trial
would be based on information developed during the investigation. However, the re-
quirement that a waiver be express serves two purposes. First, as a reflection of intent
to relinquish the privilege; and second, as a description of the extent to which the privi-
lege is foregone.
This second purpose must inhere in the requirement in order to prevent the
waiver's application to matters utterly collateral to those contemplated by the waiving
party. The fact that the trial is not collateral to the investigation merely refocuses the
issue on the clear statement of the waiver. Independent Counsel wanted cooperation in
the investigation and the trial if one were to follow. The Government of Canada al-
lowed cooperation specifically in the investigation.
It is true that once attorney-client privilege and the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination are waived in a proceeding they are waived for all purposes
in that proceeding. However, the waiver must be an informed one. If a witness were to
attempt to impose a limit with a statement that he was waiving the privilege in order to
answer one question only, a court would be bound to inform him that the waiver could
not be accepted in that form.
Similarly, the Canadians' waiver, if it is an express one, could not be accepted as
an informed waiver for all purposes when it speaks to a clear limitation to the
investigation.
63. The Talking Points state in part:
The Government [of Canada] will cooperate in the investigation being conducted
by the Independent Counsel, as appropriate in the light of relevant principles of
international law and the practice of states. In keeping with such principles and
practice, and with the need to maintain the independent conduct of Canada's for-
eign relations, the longstanding policy of successive Canadian governments has
been to decline requests for Canadian officials to testify before foreign tribunals.
Where exceptions have been permitted in the national interest, the Government
has generally required that such testimony be voluntary, that it not be given under
oath, that it take the form of a written statement, and, finally, that it not be re-
lated to the conduct of inter-governmental affairs, or to Canadian Government
policy or the policy-making process.
Talking Points, supra note 6, at 1.
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by the Ambassador as a trial witness. In either case the theory of the
Talking Points as an. express waiver was correctly decided.
2. Implied Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity may be waived either expressly or by implica-
tion.64 The allowance for a finding of an implied waiver sheds new light
on the Talking Points. The communication states that "itihe Govern-
ment [of Canada] will cooperate in the investigation being conducted
by the Independent Counsel," 6 and that "Canada is pleased to accede
to the request . . . for cooperation in obtaining information from
sources within Canada . ,6 If Canada had invoked its sovereign
immunity, the cooperation described could not have been compelled;
therefore, these statements reflect an intent to relinquish its right to
ignore the proceedings.6
While this could fairly be deemed an implied waiver of sovereign
immunity, it still must be analyzed as to its extent. Because of the re-
peated reference to the investigation, and no fair implication of an in-
tent to participate beyond that phase, this waiver seems to suffer the
same defect found in the search for waiver of diplomatic immunity. 8
However, in the earlier discussion, the extent of application was re-
stricted by the requirement that the waiver be express.
The focus shifts in implied waiver to the proceedings for which
waiver is sought. In this case, the trial and the surrounding circum-
stances should be analyzed. 9 Since the trial is the logical result of an
investigation, consent to participate in one or the other can justifiably
be implied to cover both. 0
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1982), states that:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case-
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by im-
plication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state
may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver.
See also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
(REVISED) §456(l)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 2 March 27, 1981) [hereinafter
Restatement].
65. Talking Points, supra note 6, at 1.
66. Id. at 2.
67. See, Memorandum and Order at 6, Deaver (Crim. No. 87-0096).
68. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
69. See National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); The
Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 143.
70. In National City Bank the Republic of China sued an American bank to re-
cover certain funds deposited. The District Court dismissed the bank's counterclaim on
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In a separate, related analysis it can be said that once immunity
was waived by the Government of Canada, the waiver could not be
withdrawn.7 1 This presents two questions for this case. First, whether
the investigation and the trial can be considered as one proceeding.
Second, whether participation in the proceedings was to such an extent
that immunity could no longer be claimed.
As to the first question, it could be argued that since the indict-
ment and trial grow out of the investigation, they are essentially one
continuous process. The Canadians did not appear before the Grand
Jury;72 they only responded to written questions with unsworn, written
answers. 73 Since the indictment should be based upon information
presented to the Grand Jury, it can be assumed that the indictment of
Mr. Deaver was based, at least in part, on these written answers. While
it could be a question of fact to be determined in the discretion of the
trial court, a claim that the participant state did not anticipate that the
investigation would lead to a trial, should be subject to a rebuttable
presumption against the participant. The investigation is, after all, pur-
suant to allegations of criminal activity. 4
As to the second question, the Second Circuit has held that partic-
ipation in litigation by a foreign state without an affirmative assertion
of immunity constitutes an implied waiver.75 It is also within the discre-
tion of the trial court to determine that the conduct of the participant
is of such a character as to qualify as a waiver that cannot be with-
drawn. 76 Following the preceding analysis, participation in a criminal
investigation by providing information that is sought in support of an
indictment, without asserting immunity before the indictment issues,
could be found to be evidence of a waiver that cannot be withdrawn.
grounds of sovereign immunity in this pre-FSIA case. The Supreme Court held that
although China was entitled to immunity from suit, the filing of their claim served as
an implied waiver to suit on a counterclaim not even arising out of the same transac-
tions or occurrences. Id. at 364-65. This holding is now reflected in the FSIA at 28
U.S.C. § 1607 (1982).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1982), text supra at note 64.
72. Testimony by four Canadians was sought by the Independent Counsel. Talk-
ing Points, supra note 6, at 1.
73. See, Declaration I, supra note 5, at 2-3.
74. Ethics in Government Act, 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982).
75. Canadian Overseas Ores, Ltd. v. Companio De Acero Del Pacifico, 727 F.2d
274, 278 (2d Cir. 1984).
76. Id.
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3. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Waives Diplomatic Immunity
Diplomatic immunity primarily serves the needs of the foreign sov-
ereign. 7 The Fourth Circuit has described the immunity of the diplo-
mat as a privilege that is "merely incidental to the benefit conferred on
the government he represents. '78 This concept is also inherent in the
Vienna Convention in the requirement that diplomatic immunity can
only be waived by the sending state.79 Interpreting this provision in
United States v. Arizti,80 the district court held that "the immunity is
that of [the sending] government and is not personal to [the
diplomat] .81
It seems to follow from this premise that if the sovereign has
waived immunity with respect to certain proceedings, that the diplo-
mat's derivative immunity is consequently waived as well. 82 Applying
this rationale to the Deaver case, it was within the court's discretion to
find that the cooperation by the Government of Canada constituted an
implied waiver of sovereign immunity with reference to the investiga-
tion. That waiver could not be withdrawn with reference to the trial,
thus Canada waived the derivative diplomatic immunity of Ambassa-
dor Gotlieb preventing service of a trial subpoena. 83
77. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 138.
78. United States v. Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 930 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 801 (1982). The Court relied on the legislative history of § 254c of the Act, which
indicates an intent that the section reflect Article 47 of the Vienna Convention. This
article indicates, at least to the Fourth Circuit, that immunity primarily should benefit
governments rather than individuals who serve them. Id.
The Vienna Convention recognizes that "the purpose of such privileges and immu-
nities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the func-
tions of diplomatic missions as representing States." Vienna Convention, supra note 17,
at the preamble.
79. Vienna Convention, supra note 17, art. 32.
80. 229 F.Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
81. Id. at 55.
82. The opposite situation is suggested by the circumstances of Hellenic Lines,
supra note 48, but the question was not reached. If the named party foreign state had
waived the ambassador's immunity from service of process, as Judge Washington sug-
gested in his concurring opinion in Hellenic Lines, the court still would have been faced
with the issue of the party's potential claim of sovereign immunity from suit. Relying
on the Second Circuit's reasoning in Arlington, supra note 78, it seems doubtful that
acceptance of process without filing a responsive pleading would qualify as waiver.
83. This raises the inherent issue of an ambassador's competence as a witness. In
Diehl v. United States, 265 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1959), the issue was decided in favor
of competency of the diplomat. The Court held that possible perjury by the diplomat
does not render his testimony inadmissible the on grounds that any perjury prosecution
would be, futile due to immunity. The Court reasoned that the sending state could
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B. Implied Waivers of Diplomatic Immunity
Notwithstanding the Vienna Convention mandate that waiver of
diplomatic immunity must always be express, there are several circum-
stances that result in what can only be classified as implied waivers.
One is inherent in the provisions of the Vienna Convention, and others
grow out of necessity.
The Vienna Convention provides that immunity cannot be invoked
with respect to counterclaims when a diplomat avails himself of a
court's jurisdiction for suit.84 The diplomat's voluntary initiation of the
action serves as a waiver by implication with reference to any directly
related claims that may be brought by the party opponents.85
Under the rubric of necessity, two circumstances have been raised
in which implied waivers may be found. The Restatement suggests that
temporary arrest or detention may be required for the diplomat's safety
or that of others.86 It has also been suggested that waiver can be im-
plied when the diplomatic agent's activities threaten the national secur-
ity of the receiving state.87
The preamble to the Vienna Convention gives the basis for ex-
tending immunity to the diplomat as "ensur[ing] the efficient perform-
ance of the functions of diplomatic missions .... -1 This functional
necessity theory seems to extend immunity to a field of activities that is
limited by an impact vel non on diplomatic functions. This limit is not
reflected by a provision that extends immunity to all situations until the
sending state expressly waives it. 89
A proper inquiry under the functional necessity theory would be
whether Ambassador Gotlieb's participation as a trial witness would
interfere with his diplomatic functions. Article 3 of the Vienna Conven-
tion describes these functions as representing the sending state, protect-
waive the diplomat's immunity for purposes of any perjury prosecution. The Court did
not speculate as to the practical potential of such a result.
It seems that another issue is raised when the testimony is compelled pursuant to
the waiver scenario under consideration here. Does the waiver that permits the diplo-
mat to testify extend to a potential perjury prosecution? The Diehl Court would appar-
ently answer this in the negative, as it considered the potential perjury prosecution as a
separate proceeding requiring a separate waiver. See id. at 345.
84. Vienna Convention, supra note 17, art. 32(3) (text supra note 19).
85. Id.
86. Restatement, supra note 64, § 461 comment d.
87. Comment, Diplomatic Immunity from Criminal Jurisdiction: Essential to Ef-
fective International Relations, 7 Lov. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 113, 136 (1984).
88. Vienna Convention, supra note 17, at the preamble.
89. See, Comment, A New Regime of Diplomatic Immunity: The Diplomatic Re-
lations Act of 1978, 54 TUL. L. REV. 661, 669-71 (1980).
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ing the sending state's interests, negotiating with the receiving state's
government, reporting to the sending state conditions and developments
in the receiving state, and promoting friendly relations between the two
states through developing economic, cultural and scientific relations.90
Giving testimony as a trial witness could arguably interfere with these
functions in two ways.
First, the time consumed by participation both in giving trial testi-
mony and its preparation cannot be used in pursuit of duties responsive
to the diplomatic mission.91 This risk could be minimized, however,
with a flexible approach to scheduling.
Second, the act of compelling testimony could interfere with the
promotion of friendly relations between the sending and receiving
states. On the other hand, the same could be said about the predicate
refusal by the sending state to allow the testimony.
While it has been suggested that the functional necessity theory
does not support an extension of immunity to any actions against the
diplomat that do not affect the mission's function, 92 the cumulative ef-
fect of many such actions could interfere with the diplomat's time and
the promotion of friendly relations.93 The provision requiring express
waiver in all cases, therefore, is only justified under the functional ne-
cessity theory to the extent that it avoids this cumulative effect. The
same result could be obtained if the requirement were scaled back com-
mensurate with the approach to sovereign immunity that permits
waiver by implication.
The Justice Department raised two policy arguments against a
finding of waiver in this case. First, such a finding would serve as a
basis for reciprocal treatment against United States diplomats
abroad.9 ' This only follows from a finding of implied waiver where an
express one is required, an act that would seem to indicate a disregard
for the Vienna Convention. It does not follow from a finding that no
diplomatic immunity attaches to areas where sovereign immunity has
been waived, an act that is perfectly in line with the Convention's
90. Vienna Convention, supra note 17, art. 3(1).
91. Interference with the diplomatic function by making demands on the diplo-
mat's time is based on an assailable premise that the time at trial would not have been
used for non-diplomatic activities.
92. E.g., Comment, supra note 89, at 681-82; Note, Insuring Against Abuse of
Diplomatic Immunity, 38 STAN, L. REV. 1517, 1521-22 (1996).
93. See Diplomatic Immunity: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1978).
94. Statement of Interest of the United States at 12, Deaver (Crim. No. 87-0096).
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stated purpose."5
The Justice Department also suggested that the success of the
United States' policy of seeking voluntary cooperation of foreign gov-
ernments in law enforcement matters would be thwarted if such coop-
eration were construed as a waiver of immunity.96 Two weaknesses in
this argument are made apparent by the Deaver case. First, there is no
history that cooperation has ever been litigated as a waiver. Second, the
cooperation sought in the Deaver case concerned the Canadian Govern-
ment's intimate involvement in the matters under investigation.
V. CONCLUSION
The District Court correctly assumed jurisdiction to decide the is-
sue of waiver of diplomatic immunity in this case, and the issue itself
was correctly decided. However, the issuance of a trial subpoena might
have been justified if the court had been asked to consider the possibil-
ity of an implied waiver of sovereign immunity both by the language of
the "Talking Points" diplomatic note and the actual participation by
the Canadian Government in the investigation. Such a finding would
not offend the basic purpose underlying the extension of immunity to
diplomats.
Richard C. Kay
95. The Conference that produced the Vienna Convention adopted a resolution
that "recommends that the sending state should waive the immunity of members of its
diplomatic mission ... when this can be done without impeding the performance of the
functions of the diplomatic mission ... Restatement, supra note 64, § 461, Report-
ers' Note 14.
96. Statement of Interest of the United States at 12, Deaver (Crim. No. 87-0096).
